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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DOHR~fAX HOTEL SUPPLY CO., ) 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff' and Respondent. 
vs. \ Case No. 6207 
Beau Brummel, Inc., j 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Appellant 
0. W. CARLSON, 
J. ~f. CARLSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
FEB 1 t) 19tn 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IXDEX OF CITATIONS 
Page 
Chicago Stell Foundry Co. v. F. M. Crowell Co., 
14 Pac. (2nd) 1105 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Cobbey on Replevin (2nd Ed.), Sec. 795, p. 421. ... -------------------- 14 
2 Corpus Juris 602, p. 921.·------------------------------------------·----------------- 10 
2 Corpus Juris 731 (2), p. 960------------------------------------------------------ 10 
2 Corpus Juris 733, p. 962-------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
55 Corpus Juris 7 57 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
11 Cyc. 2 0 4 ----------------------------------------·----------------·---------------------------- 17 
Hirch. v. Ogden, 51 Utah 55 3 at 56 3---------------------------------------------- 17 
Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611--------------------------------------------·---- 17 
Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 730 .... ---------------------------------------- 11 
Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 734·------------------------------------------- 11 
Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 735 ................ ---------------------------- 12 
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3018, Sec. 1760.............. 10 
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3021. ... ------------------------------ 11 
Parks v. Sutton, 60 Utah 356 at 365 .... ---------------------------------------- 17 
Revised Statutes of Utah, Title 81, Ch. 1, S€c. 15.................... 15 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 28-5-8, 20-8-24------------------------------------ 18 
Shinn on Replevin, Sec. 551 (12) p. 512------------------------------------ 14 
Sperry Flour Co. v. DeMoss, 18 Pac. (2nd) 242........................ 17 
Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, 7 Pac. (2nd) 383 at 386................ 15 
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 
211 P. 1998, 60 U. 435 .... ------------------------------------------------------ 15 
Wells on Replevin, p. 518 .. ----------------------·------------------------------------- 14 
Williams vs. Lowenthall, 12 Pac. (2nd) 75 at 78...................... 16 
Williston on Contracts , Vol. 2, p. 1514--------·----------------------------- 14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the Slate ol Utah 
DOHR~L\X HOTEL SUPPLY CO., ) 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
rs. 
Beau Brummel, Inc., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6207 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dohrman Hotel Supply Company, a foreign corpora-
tion, with offices and stores at Los Angeles and San 
Fran<·isco, brought suit against Appellant for certain 
t'('Staurant equipment or the value thereof. The com-
plaint alleges no contract or agreement but alleges 
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simply that the plaintiff is the owner of and entitled to 
immediate possession of certain restaurant fixtures, 
equipment and utensils, and though demand has been 
made for their return, defendant has failed to deliver 
the same (Ab. 1 and 2), and that the value of the prop-
erty is $555.08. The alleged value was increased by 
amendment to $900 over a year later (Ab. 3 and 4). 
Beau Brummell, Inc., denied the alleged ownership 
by plaintiff and set up two affirmative answers-First, 
that a certain thermotainer charged as part of the pur-
chase price in a contract of sale was defective in construc-
tion and design and would not render the service for 
which it was sold and purchased and that defendant re. 
turned the same to plaintiff and claims a deduction of 
$500 from the total purchase price by way of recoupment. 
Second, that defendant and plaintiff entered into an 
agreement of settlement by which plaintiff agreed to ac-
cept 1the thermotainer on return and allow a credit of $375 
and that defendant shipped the thermotainer back and 
sent a check for $152.44, the balance of the purchase price. 
By way of reply plaintiff admits the return of the 
thermotainer and receipt of check for $152.44, but denies 
the alleged warranties and denies the alleged agreement 
of settlement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It was stipulated that the contract of sale between 
the parties included many articles not delivered by plain-
tiff so that 'the price ·of the articles delivered was $2412.26 
and a carrying charge of $80.41 was added making the 
price of goods plus carrying charge, $2492.67.. Plaintiff 
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also admitted cash payments received amounting to 
$1966.33 in addition to the $152.44 tendered with the re-
turn of the thermotainer. Thus, defendan1t maintains the 
amount paid plus the credit allowed for the return of 
thermotainer plus the $152.44 settled the agreed purchase 
price of $2492.17 thus : 
Cash paid ..................................................................... $1966.33 
Return of thermotainer................................. 375.00 
Balance tendered ···················-·········-·················· 152.44 
Total ________________________________________________________________________ $2493. 77 
Over objections by defendant that the sales agree-
ment was not competent to prove reservations therein 
under the complaint, which is a general allegation of 
ownership, the contract --was admitted and read 1to the 
jury. Don Nelson, an employee of plaintiff, testified 
that the value of 1the property including the thermotainer 
in possession of plaintiff is about $900 to $1000, although 
he had not seen any of it for two years. Attorney for 
plaintiff testified that he told Mr. Glaus before this 
suit tha1t he would have to pay a balance due or plaintiff 
would take the property, but Glaus replied there was no 
balance due. Plaintiff then rested. 
Defendant produced several witnesses to prove the 
settlement agreement alleged in its answer and the war-
ranties as 1to the thermotainer and its uselessness for the 
purpose for which it ·was sold. The parts of the testimony 
pertinent to the issue before this Court will be referred 
to in the argument later herein. The issues raised in 
the lower court as grounds for the directed verdict was 
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that the authority of the plaintiff's agent, Don Nelson, 
to make a settlement contract was not proved; and that 
there was not sufficient evidence admitted to prove an 
express or implied warranty, or the breach thereof, so 
as to entitled defendant to return the thermotainer and 
receive credit or recoupment. The Court directed aver-
dict in favor of plaintiff for the possession of the mer-
chandise or the sum of $526.34 the value thereof, which 
verdict was signed by the jury as ordered. Ten days 
later the Court made a judgment on 1the verdict but in-
creased the amount of the judgment from $526.34 to 
$678.52 plus costs and disbursements. 
Motion for new trial was made by defendant (Ab. 39) 
and denied and a motion to retax costs w:as made by de-
fendant and was granted in part (Ab. 41). 
Appellant's Assignment of Errors (Ab. 43) assigns 
as error the directing of the verdict, the entering of judg-
ment on the verdict and the denying of appellant's motion 
for a new trial. Also, appellant assigns as errors denial 
of appellant's motion to retax costs and the allowance 
of various cost items, as well as the overruling of defend-
ant's ohpjection to the admission of certain evidence. 
POINTS AND AUfHORITIES 
Sufficiency of evidence to submit to the jury the 
question of Don Nelson's authority to make the contract 
alleged. 
The testimony on the agency of Don Nelson and the 
contract for the return of the thermotainer is as fol-
lows: 
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Don X elson \Yas the agent for Dohrman Hotel Sup-
ply Company and was the only representative here in 
1935 (~-\._b. 30). He had been plaintiff's sales representa-
tive sine 1929 continuous}.''· Correspondence from Nelson 
was receiYed by the company in May, 1935, about Beau 
Brumn1el account (Ab. 28). He sold restauran1t equip-
ment, also collected money and checks for plaintiff, also 
reported on complaints of customers, had attended to 
taking back merchandise in dealings \Yith customers and 
returned defectiYe materials complained about; was the 
only representatiYe of plaintiff here in 1935 and prior 
thereto (Ab. 29 and 30). Discussed with customers their 
complaints. He tried to sell the thermotainer, when it 
was here, to the U. A. C. He had no instructions from 
the company (plaintiff) at that time. Mr. Glaus com-
plained about the defects of the steam ta:ble purchased 
on the contract. It was not constructed as ordered. N el-
son gave Glaus orders to employ a tinner and have it 
fLxed and charge the bill to plaintiff. Glaus did so and re-
ceived credit from plaintiff for the expense. Defendant 
dealt with Nelson on all previous transactions, collections 
and sales (Ah. 14, 25). Mr. Glaus complained to Nelson 
about the thermotainer in March, 1935, and the second 
time he came herein :May defendant complained that the 
thermotainer would not work. It had been taken out and 
stored. Glaus said something would have to be done 
about it. Nelson said he could move it in his territory. 
He said he could take it and sell it on his next trip (Ab. 
13). On his next trip further complaints were made by 
rl<'l'endant. Nelson said he would write his house. In a 
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day or two Nelson reported he had a wire from his house 
and said if defendant wanted to take a loss of $125 on 
the thermotainer they would take it back butt defendant 
would have to pay the freight and crating. Nelson did 
not tell what he wrote (Ab. 14, 18, 24). Exhibit L, a 
letter from respondent dated June 8, 1935, reads that a 
proposition will soon be made on the thermotainer. (All 
the foregoing evidence is not contradicted and almost all 
admitted). Further evidence of plaintiff's is that no tele-
gram was shown defendant by Nelson and no conversation 
about buying dishes (Ab. 16, 17, 25 ). Don Nelson testified 
he showed Mr. Glaus the telegram which he received from 
the Los Angeles office. The purported telegram or copy 
was introduced over objections of defendant. It reads: 
''Don Nelson: 
Will accept return thermotainer at twenty-five 
percent discount from purchase price, freight pre-
paid to Los Angeles provided order you mention is 
placed with Los Angeles unit satisfactory credit 
terms. 
C. E. !tfcCoskey." 
Some orders were given Nelson for dishes at about 
that time. Gave order f.or $100 worth. Defendant was 
compelled 'by the insurance company to replace in the 
Mayflower Syracuse china which only the Z. C. M. I. 
could sell. There is no dispute as to the fact that the 
letter Nelson wrote, to which the telegram was a reply, 
was no't shown to defendant. Plaintiff offered in evidence 
a letter never seen by defendant, and purporting to be 
the letter Don Nelson wrote to Mr. McCloskey in Los 
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Angeles. Over objections of defendant that it was self-
serving and immaterial it was received as Exhibit M. 
This letter notes that it is from Los Angeles, California, 
and reads in part that Glaus had paid $500 for the ther-
motainer • ·and eYer sinre I have made this territory he 
has been trying to get us to sell it or give him full credit 
for it'', and in effect Glaus ·would give an order ''for the 
goods he \\ill need for the :Mayflower which will run 
around 2 or 3 thousand if we will take back the thermo-
tainer. '' 
Appellant con:tends that the foregoing facts present 
sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of 
the authority of Don Nelson to make the agreement, for 
and on behalf of respondent, that was testified to by Mr. 
and Mrs. Glaus, namely, that appellant should return the 
thermotainer and prepay the freight to Los Angeles for 
the credit of $375 or at a 25% loss (Ah.14, 16, 17, 18,24-25 
and Ex. 2). The agency is admitted. The only question 
is as to the extent of Nelson's authority. The evidence 
of past dealings by Nelson show authority to adjust 
claims, hear and settle complaints as to defects of mer-
chandise and take return of goods as well as order re-
pairs of equipment sold by respondent, and make collec-
tions. Secre1t instructions given by respondent to Nelson 
contrary to his apparent authority, and not known to ap-
pellant, do not prevent respondent from being bound by 
agent Nelson's agreement. "\Y e cite the following author-
ities in support of our foregoing contention: 
The fad of agency and extent thereof is one for the 
jury: 
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2 Corpus Juris, Section 731 ( 2), p. 960: 
''When any evidence is adduced tending to 
prove the existence of a disputed agency its exist-
ence or nonexistence is as a general rule a ques-
tion of fact for 1the jury, aided by proper instruc-
tions from the court, even though the evidence is 
not full and satisfactory; and in such cases it is 
error for the court to take the question from the 
jury hy directing a verdict, by instruction, by non-
suit, or by sustaining a demurrer to the evidence. 
* * * But even where the facts are undisputed, 
if different conclusions can reasonably be drawn 
therefrom, the question should be submitted to the 
jury." 
2 Corpus Juris, Section 733, p. 962: 
"Where the nature and extent of an authority 
orally conferred upon an agent are to be deter-
mined upon conflicting evidence, or to be implied 
from the facts and circumstances, the questions 
as to the nature and extent of the agent's author-
ity and whe:ther the particular act in controversy 
was in the scope of his authority are usually ques-
tions of fact for the jury, guided by proper instruc-
tions from the court, and in such cases it is error 
to take the question from then by nonsuit, in-
struction, or direction of verdict.'' 
;2 Gorp us Juris, Section 602, p. 921. 
Secret instructions do not relieve the principal from 
liability: 
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3018, 
Sec. 1760: 
"Outside of the class of public agents the 
actual authority conferred hy a principal upon his 
agent is practically inaccessable to the public at 
large. Accordingly, persons who do not know 
what the agent's authority is, are justified in 
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dealing- with him upon the assumption that he has 
authority ·w·hich the principal indicates by his 
conduct that the agent possesses.'' 
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3021 
''The principal may be estopped to deny the 
authority of the agent by actively holding him out 
to the world as his agent. Thus, private instruc-
tions contrary to the apparent authority of the 
agen1t and not known to the person dealing with 
him, or an uncommunica'ted revocation of the 
agent's authority, do not prevent the principal 
from being bound by the contract of the agent 
made in his behalf with a person acting in good 
faith." 
:Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 730 
''As has already been pointed out a conflict 
is often deemed 1to arise between 'authority' and 
'instructions,' and the rule is constantly declared 
to be that' an apparent authority cannot be limited 
by secret instructions-'" 
Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 734 
''The test is, were the alleged instructions de-
signed and calculated to fix and determine the 
character of the agent, or merely to prescribe the 
manner in which he should exercise the powers 
incident to a character already or otherwise im-
posed 1 As bearing upon this, were the alleged in-
structions designed to be made known to those 
dealing with the agent or concealed, and, as bear-
ing upon this, would their disclosure promote or 
defeat his purpose which the principal had in 
mind.-'' 
There is no dispute that Nelson was plaintiff's agent 
and was authorized to contract for the return of the ther-
motainer for a $375 credit and that appellant relied uuon 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
such authority and freighted the 1thermotainer at his ·ex-
pense back to respondent. The instruction to Nelson that 
he was to make the con tract if he received the order 
spoken of was a secret one and never intended to be com-
municated to appellan1t, for such disclosure to appellant 
would amount to the agent's saying-you may take a loss 
of $125 by the return of the thermotainer and we will 
make out of you a good profit on a big order. Such a dis-
closure would not promote a $2000 or $3000 sale of mer-
chandise but would defeat the purpose of the principal. 
There was no intention on the part of McCloskey that 
Nelson should disclose the unusual limitation that an 
order should be first obtained for $2000 or $3000 before 
the $375 credit could be allowed for the return of a $500 
machine. The failure of the principal to disclose to ap-
pellant the unusual limitation referred to is regarded in 
law as a representation that no limitation exists: See 
Meech em, Vol. 1, Sec. 735. 
DEFENSE OF WARRANTY 
The evidence in brief in support of this defense of 
appellant's answer is as follows: 
The thermotainer is an electrically operated table to 
take the place of a steam table and has a cabinet arrange-
ment for retaining foods for long periods of time. It is 
supposed to have some advantage over the steam table 
because of its construction (A·b. 28). It is supposed to 
keep foods hot and moist ready for serving (Ab. 13, 2~ 
and 23). But 1this thermotainer dried food out so there 
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were constant complaints from customers. It was defec-
tive right off the reel. It took me (Glaus) a long time to 
be convinced it would not work (Ab. 15-16). It was not 
adaptable to appellant's use. I (Glaus) could not ~tell 
what the defect was because I am not a mechanic. It was 
sold to me to work on the same principle as a steam table 
for the kitchen (Ab. 18-19). If it would work we would 
never have taken it out of service. Leland Hogan, the 
service man of Utah Power and Light Co., was called 
time and again to see what was the matter with it. He 
came once or twice a week for a period of time. Tried 
using it after each attempt at adjustment but it dried 
the meats up (Ab. 23-24). Three witnesses so testified. 
Wrote letter of complaint to Dohrmans (Ah. 25). Com-
plained to Nelson. Nelson admitted the complaints (Ab. 
30). Thermotainer is so constructed cooks could not 
alter inside construction. The average layman doesn't 
know anything about it (Ab. 30). Never been another 
machine around just like it. Hogan, the service man, said 
could not remedy the trouble though he has serviced many 
similar ones (Ab. 20-21). Did everything that could be 
done without changing the manufactured pattern or con-
struction. But reports that it did not work were made 
after each attempt at adjustment. Hogan has studied 
thi~ kind of equipment and even built them. 
:Manager of respondent who made the sale of the 
thermotainer said it is one of the finest pieces of equip-
ment of all; that it originally cost $1500 and that he 
would guarantee it (.A b. 12). 
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The defense of breach of warranty is pleadable; 
Cobbey on Replevin (2nd Ed.), Sec. 795, p. 
421: 
'' * :J(, * In replevin by seller of goods, after 
notes given in payment therefor and secured by 
mortgage thereon have become overdue, defend-
ant may show payment in part and damages from 
breach of warranty. A breach of warranty may 
be used as a cause for an original action, a coun1ter-
option of the warrantee. When used as a defense 
it is by way of recoupment; that is, it cuts back 
and destroys the plaintiff's :fight to recover." 
"\V ells on Replevin, p. 518. 
"* * * and generally whatever demand the 
defendant has growing out of the same subject 
ma1tter as the plaintiff's claim, may he recouped." 
Shipp on Replevin, p. 512. 
"Sec. 551 (12) Counter-Claim.-The term 
Counter-claim is used in code procedure to include 
what is contemplated under the common law pro-
cedure, both as a set-off and recoupment. For this 
reason there is some confusion in the books. The 
true rule regarding a counter-claim seems to be 
this: where a claim arises out of the same trans-
ac1tion which is the basis of the replevin, i. e., 
when it is in the nature of a recoupment it may be 
interposed in replevin; but where it is in the na-
ture of a set-off, i. e. ; consisting of damages not 
arising from the same transaction, but from mat-
ters outside of it, it cannot be interposed in re-
plevin.'' 
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, p. 1514. 
"The theory of recoupment is that plain-
tiff's damages are cut down to an amount which 
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will compensate him for the value of what he has 
given.'' 
In this case there is an express warranty as shown 
by the evidence and a guarantee of fitness. But there is 
also an implied warranty that the thermotainer was rea-
sonably fit for the described purpose of keeping cooked 
meats and vegetables hot and moist for later serving and 
perform the functions of a steam table; see 
Revised Statu~es of Utah, Title 81, ch. 1, 
Sec. 15. 
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by im-
plication, makes known to the seller the particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required, and 
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgment (·whether he is the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for 
such purpose.'' 
"(6) An express warranty or condition does 
not negative a warranty or condition implied un-
der this title, unless inconsisten:t therewith.'' 
See 1\L H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co., 211 P. 998, 60 U. 435. 
Starr Piano Co. v. 1\i[artin, 7 Pac. (2nd) 383 
at 386. 
In this case action for instalments was brought on a 
conditional sales contract and defendant counter-claimed 
for breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose for 
which sold. The Court said: 
'' * * * Furthermore, in a sale such as this 
there would he an implied warranty that the equip-
ment which was contracted to ·be sold for a par-
ticular purpose, of which the proposed seller ho.J 
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full knowledge, was reasonably fit for such pur-
pose. 
Chicago Stell Foundry Co. v. F. M. Crowell 
Co., 14 Pac. (2nd) 1105. 
This is an action for goods sold and defendant coun-
t~r-claimed for ·breach of warranty and defectiveness of 
material sold. Judgment on the counter-claim was af-
firmed. The Court said : 
''Where an article of personal property is 
sold for a definite purpose made known 'to the 
seller, and the seller represents that the article 
will perform that particular purpose, there is a 
warranty of fitness which protects the purchaser 
and for which the seller is liable, in event the ar-
ticle fails to do what it was sold to do." 
Williams vs. Lowenthall, 12 Pac. (2nd) 75 
at 78. 
(6, 7). "It may be conceded that, notwith-
standing the absence of an express warranty of 
fitness, nevertheless the circumstances presented 
by the evidence were such that a warranty that the 
instrument was fit for the purpose for which it was 
sold was raised by implication of law.'' 
55 Corpus Juris 757. 
''The fact that an article has a trade name 
does not negative the existence of an implied war-
ran1ty of fitness for a particular purpose when it 
is purchased, not by name, but for a particular 
purpose and supplied for that purpose. * * * '' 
Whether there was an express or implied warranty 
that the thermo'tainer was fit for the particular purpose 
for which it was sold, is a question of fact for the jury; 
see: 
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Sperry Flour Co. Y~. De l\foss, 18 Pac. (2nd) 
242. 
'' \Yhether there was implied warranty that 
flour sold under trade-name was fit for particular 
purpose, and breach thereof 'held' for Jury." 
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to submit to the jury the defense of breach of war-
ranty; that there was sufficient evidence of warranty by 
respondent of the fitness of the thermotainer for its use 
as a piece of kitchen equipment and there is certainly 
abundant evidence of its total unfitness for the purpose 
for which it was sold. 
Appellants submit also that sufficient evidence to go 
to the jury was submitted in support of appellant's de-
fense of agreement of settlement by return of the ther-
motainer for the credit of $375. Assignments 1, 2, 3, 6 
and 7, and 21 of Appellant's assignment of errors pertain 
to the direction of verdict, judgment thereon and denial 
of appellant's motion for new trial. Said assignments 
of error are fully discussed in the foregoing. 
Assignments of error numbered 4 and 5 pertain to 
the cost bill. Taxable costs are entirely creatures of the 
statute and only those costs specifically provided for are 
taxable. 
Hirch v. Ogden, 51 Utah 553 at 563. 
''Costs are only recoverable by force of the 
statute, and allowance of them, in any case will 
depend on the terms of the statutes.'' 
11 Cyc. 204 to the same effect. 
Parks v. Sutton, 60 Utah 356 at 365. 
IIoughston v. Barton, 49 Utah 611. 
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There is no statutory provision for allowance of item 
for clerk's fees for taking a deposition as described in 
assignment of errors number 5. And wi1tness fees are 
made taxable only for witnesses who attend court; see 
section 28-5-8 and 20-8-24 of 1933, Revised Statutes. Also 
the statutes are silent on premium for a cost bond for 
which respondent lists an item of $30. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. W. CARLSON, 
J. M. CARLSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant . 
• 
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